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Abstract
We document strong persistence in the performance of trades of in-
dividual investors. Investors classi￿ed in the top 10 percent place other
trades that on average earn excess returns of 15 basis points per day. A
rolling-forward strategy of going long ￿rms purchased by previously suc-
cessful investors and shorting ￿rms purchased by previously unsuccessful
investors results in excess returns of 5 basis points per day. These returns
are not con￿ned to small stocks nor to stocks in which the investors are
likely to have inside information. Our results suggest that skillful individ-
ual investors exploit market ineﬃciencies to earn abnormal pro￿ts, above
and beyond any pro￿ts available from well-known strategies based upon
size, value, or momentum.
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NTT fellowship of the Mitsui Life Center.Financial economists have debated the eﬃcient market hypothesis (EMH) for decades.
In most formal tests, econometricians measure the pro￿tability of speci￿ed strategies
designed to exploit possible mispricing. Such tests are good at identifying whether
a particular strategy represented a potential pro￿t opportunity. However, such tests
may fail to identify a market ineﬃciency if the econometrician has chosen a strategy
that is unrelated to investor biases.
Furthermore, such tests do not identify whether the proposed strategies were ac-
tually exploited, or even recognized by sophisticated traders at the time of their in-
vestments. Often econometricians employ ￿nancial, econometric, and computational
databases and technology that were not readily available to traders at the time.1
Thus, some authors have suggested that the traditional eﬃcient market hypothesis
is too strong, and have proposed milder notions of eﬃciency that re￿ect reasonable
constraints on the ability of intelligent investors to process information (see, e.g., the
￿adaptive eﬃciency￿ argument of Daniel and Titman (1999)). In a similar spirit, we
oﬀer an approach for evaluating market eﬃciency that is based upon not just whether
pro￿t opportunities are in principle available, but whether some set of real investors
have demonstrated abnormal skill in generating actual trading pro￿ts. Our evidence
suggests that even this milder form of market eﬃciency is violated.
According to the EMH, investors￿ risk-adjusted performance should be random:
unless they possess relevant private information, they should neither consistently beat
the market nor should they, in the absence of transaction costs, consistently under-
perform the market. If those individual investors who have performed abnormally
well in the past continue to perform abnormally well in the future by an amount that
is not explained by mere chance, market eﬃciency may be violated. However, it is
possible that investors whose abnormal performance persists are exploiting superior
private information about fundamentals, rather than superior skilla ti d e n t i f y i n ga n d
exploiting market mispricing. Therefore, in addition to testing for performance per-
sistence, we test whether abnormal performance is persistent among mid- to large-cap
stocks, which presumably have less information asymmetry. In addition, we examine
whether persistence of abnormal performance is con￿ned to the few stocks in which
investors transact frequently (and thus are more likely to possess private information)
or whether it is present even in the companies in which our investors transact only
once. Finally, we examine whether some investors persistently underperform; under
an information story, such a ￿nding would, implausibly, require investors to have
superior information and then trade the wrong way.2
1For example, although historical price data is in principle public information that is costlessly available
to all, in reality such data is costly, as evidenced by the fees researchers pay for access to electronic databases.
2Investors who systematically underperform might at ￿rst seem to present a paradox for the market
ineﬃciency theory as well. On the one hand they display a superior skill at identifying ineﬃcient prices,
1An advantage of using individual trader performance to evaluate market eﬃciency
is that this approach vastly expands the set of strategies indirectly being tested and
the set of observable variables on which trades potentially may be conditioned. The
burden is no longer on the econometrician to identify and measure the variables used
in constructing trading strategies. Our approach obviates the need to run thousands
of diverse tests and then speculate as to how to discount the statistical signi￿cance
of these tests to adjust for datamining.
At ￿rst glance, it would seem that a search for evidence that individual traders
outperform the market is not very promising. Individual traders are often regarded as
at best uninformed, at worst fools. The noise trader approach to securities markets,
for example, identi￿es individual investors as generating demands that are generally
driven by liquidity or psychological considerations unrelated to the information about
underlying security values (see, e.g., Black (1986), De Long et al. (1990) and Lee et al.
(1991)). Several studies have documented the poor average performance of individual
traders relative to the market and to institutional traders. For example, individual
traders appear to trade too much, maintain underdiversi￿ed portfolios, and hold onto
losing positions for too long.3
However, not all individual traders do poorly in their investments. Indeed, as Bar-
ber and Odean (2000) note, the top-performing quartile of the individual accounts
in their dataset outperform the market on average by 0.5 percent per month. Their
￿ndings raise the fascinating question of whether some individual investors have su-
perior skill, and are able to pro￿t thereby. Of course, given the low diversi￿cation
of many of the accounts, one expects substantial cross-sectional variation in account
performance by chance even if there are no diﬀerences in skill. The central question
we address in this paper, therefore, is whether individual investors who earn pro￿ts
on their trades are merely lucky, or whether some of them are indeed skillful.
The issue of whether superior performance persistence exists has been examined
most extensively for mutual funds. Most studies of mutual funds ￿nd that the abnor-
mal performance of the average funds lags that of the overall market.4 Similarly, only
limited evidence exists suggesting that those funds that outperform can be expected
a n do nt h eo t h e rh a n dt h e yt r a d ei nt h ew r o n gd i r e c t i o ni na s s o c i a t i o nw i t ht h ei n e ﬃciency. The puzzle is
resolved by recognizing that if members of a group of investors are subject to common misperceptions, their
total trading as a group will move prices in a direction adverse to their desired trades. Thus, an ineﬃcient
markets story will involve not just smart traders who make money by exploiting ineﬃciency, but foolish
traders who lose money in the processing of generating the ineﬃciency.
3See, e.g., Blume and Friend (1975), Ferris, Haugen, and Makhija (1988), Odean (1997), Odean (1998),
Barber and Odean (2000), Grinblatt and Keloharju (2001). Cohen et al. (2001) and Hirshleifer et al. (2001)
also report evidence suggesting that individual investors trade unpro￿tably in response to cash ￿ow news
and earnings announcements.
4See Carhart (1995), Malkiel (1995), Chevalier and Ellison (1999), and Daniel et al. (1997). The exception
is Wermers (2000) who, after controlling for cash drag, ￿nds positive average excess returns.
2to continue to do so in the future.5
While few would expect individual traders to be, on average, better informed
than mutual fund managers, there are compelling reasons to believe that individual
traders are better positioned to exploit a given informational advantage. First, indi-
vidual traders almost always trade smaller positions than professional traders. As a
result, the pressure that their trades impart on prices is likely to be much less. This
makes them far better positioned to trade using strategies that exploit smaller or
shorter-term deviations from fundamental values. Second, individual traders are less
constrained than mutual funds to hold a diversi￿ed portfolio or to track the market
or a given benchmark.
From the standpoint of the researcher seeking to detect performance persistence,
the transaction-level datasets of individual accounts are far superior to mutual fund
data, which are generally available only at a quarterly frequency. If the pro￿to p -
portunities exploited by investors are transient, then tests that rely on transactions
reported at a quarterly frequency are considerably disadvantaged.
Using the transaction record of over 110,000 accounts at a major discount bro-
kerage, we conduct a variety of tests of individual performance persistence. First,
to examine whether traders exhibit statistically signi￿cant persistence in their per-
formance, we divide the sample in half and examine the correlation in the excess
performance of an account￿s trades between the two halves. While we measure an in-
vestor￿s performance at a variety of horizons, the magnitude of excess returns earned
on his trades drops oﬀ sharply after ￿ve to ten trading days. Thus, we typically
focus on the average return he earns on his trades over the subsequent week as our
measure of performance. Moreover, to ensure that our measures of trader pro￿ts are
not driven by any price pressure created by the trade, in most of our tests we wait
a day before beginning our measurement of returns. We also measure performance
as the p-value of a one-sided test of whether the mean return earned by the account
over the sample half is positive, and then compute the correlation of the probability
across sample halves.
There is some debate as to the proper way to adjust for risk in evaluating invest-
ment performance. It is common to use factor benchmarks such as the 3-factor model
of Fama and French (1992), or to control for characteristics such as book/market, size,
5Lehman and Modest (1987), Grinblatt and Titman (1992), Hendricks et al. (1993), Goetzmann and
Ibbotsen (1994), Brown and Goetzmann (1995), Elton et al. (1996), and Wermers (1996) all document
evidence of persistence in mutual fund performance. However, Carhart (1992, 1997) and Wermers (2000) ￿nd
that most of the persistence can be explained by persistence in mutual fund expense ratios and momentum
in stock returns. Baks et al. (2001) employ a Bayesian approach to detect managers with positive expected
alphas.
3or momentum (see, e.g., Daniel et al (1997)). However, each of these characteristics
can be a proxy for market mispricing, as can the factor loadings in factors that are
generated by portfolios based upon such characteristics. Thus, such benchmarks can
absorb some of the abnormal performance that the test is trying to measure (for
recent discussions, see e.g., Loughran and Ritter (2000) and Daniel, Hirshleifer and
Teoh (2001)). We use as our benchmarks the Fama French (1992) 3-Factor Model
and the Daniel et al. (1997) characteristics-based adjustment. Readers who regard
these benchmarks as re￿ecting models of risk can regard this as a fair test for ab-
normal performance of investors. Readers who regard these benchmarks as capturing
mispricing may regard our tests as showing the ability of sophisticated individual
investors to earn pro￿ts above and beyond any gains or losses they earn based upon
other well-known eﬀects such as value, size and momentum.
We ￿nd that trader performance, whether measured as an average excess return or
as a p-value, is consistently correlated across the two sample halves. The correlations
are approximately 10 percent, and diﬀer from zero with high signi￿cance. The positive
correlation survives a variety of robustness checks, including comparing even and odd
quarters, removing the smallest one-third of the sample of CRSP stocks, and removing
an account￿s trade in a stock that the investor has traded previously (a possible
indication that the individual has access to inside information). To see whether the
persistence is due to stock selection ability or to trader ability (or negative ability)
to time the market, we recompute performance replacing individual stock returns
with overall market returns. In this way, we can test whether individuals consistently
purchase stocks before the market rises. When individual stock returns are replaced
with the overall market return in this way, we ￿nd only very limited evidence that
accounts have persistence in their ability to time the market.
Next, to examine the economic signi￿cance of performance persistence, we classify
each trade of each account according to the performance of all other trades placed by
that account. In this way, we maximize our precision in classifying an account accord-
ing to the investor￿s degree of skill. We call this a complementary image procedure, in
analogy to the phenomenon in visual perception in which a ￿gure is identi￿ed through
its contrast with a complementary background. The complementary image procedure
uses ex post information, and therefore does not provide a feasible trading strategy.
However, the procedure does strictly quarantine the classi￿cation stage for a trade
from the performance of that trade itself. This is essential, as otherwise we would
induce a mechanical bias in which trades classi￿ed as coming from skillful traders
are more likely to be pro￿table, even if there were no persistence. The classi￿cation
for each trade is made by sorting according to the one-sided p-value in the test of
the hypothesis that all other trades by that account have a positive rather than zero
4(possibly adjusted) mean return. Finally, we form decile portfolios and calculate the
average of the returns earned on each trade during the subsequent week.
The diﬀerence between the returns of the top and bottom portfolios is striking.
Trades in the top decile earn excess returns between 12 and 15 basis points per
day during the following week. Trades in the bottom decile lose between 11 and
12 basis points per day. Over the entire holding period of the trade6, the average
trade in the top decile earns ￿ve basis points per day whereas the average trade in
the bottom decile loses one basis point per day. The results are highly statistically
signi￿cant and are invariant to using a factor- or characteristic-based risk/mispricing
adjustment. The results are also robust to the removal of the smallest third of CRSP
stocks and to the removal of trades in stocks traded more than once by the account.
This suggests that the top traders earn economically large returns from their stock
selection skills in a wide range of companies.
Finally, to investigate whether the information contained in account trading be-
havior oﬀers pro￿table trading opportunities to those with access to this information,
we construct and test the pro￿tability of a trading strategy that uses only ex ante
data at each point in time. On each date, we rank all traders who have traded at least
2 5t i m e su pt ot h a tp o i n t .W er a n kt h e ma c c o r d i n gt ot h eo n es i d e dp-value for testing
whether the mean return is positive. Next, for each quintile of traders, we construct
a portfolio consisting of all stocks purchased by traders in that quintile during the
previous week, weighted by the stocks￿ market values. We then construct a zero-cost
trading strategy that is long the portfolio of the top quintile and short the portfolio of
the bottom quintile. The returns of this strategy are then benchmark-adjusted using
factor and characteristic-based adjustments.
Using the one-week holding period, this strategy earns excess returns of 5 basis
points per day, or 13.7 percent per annum. Again, the results are robust to removing
small stocks and trades in stocks an account has traded previously. The strategy
is also assessed using a one-day and a one-month holding period. Using the one-
day holding period, the return is 7 basis points per day, while the daily return of
one-month holding period is indistinguishable from zero.
The paper proceeds as follows. In Section I we describe the data. Section II reports
the results of the across-sample correlation tests and the estimation of returns of
trades of accounts ranked according to the performance of their other trades. Section
II also discusses the results of a trading strategy designed to exploit information
contained in the trades of well- and poorly-performing accounts. Section III provides
some interpretation of our evidence and Section IV concludes.
6The median holding period for active accounts is 199 days.
5I. Data
This paper studies a dataset provided by a large discount brokerage ￿rm on the trades
placed by 115,856 accounts from January 1990 through November 1996.7 Table 1
reports summary statistics. Since many of our tests focus on the 16,668 accounts
that placed at least 25 trades during the sample period, we also report statistics for
this subset. Overall, the average account placed 15 purchases of an average size of
$8,599 in 9.2 diﬀerent companies, though, not surprisingly, the median and standard
deviation indicate substantial right-skewness in the distribution. The median account
placed six purchase trades in four diﬀerent companies at an average value of $4,369.
For the subset of purchases that were later (at least partially) sold in our sample
period, the holding period for the average (median) account was 378.11 (293) days.
The lower panel of Table 1 reports summary statistics for accounts that traded
a minimum of 25 times during the sample period. The average account traded an
average size of $10,301 in 66.4 trades in 36.8 diﬀerent companies. Again the median
￿gures are somewhat lower, with the median account trading 43 times in 26 diﬀerent
companies at an average value of $5675. Not surprisingly, the average holding period
for the active accounts, 244.33 days, is considerably lower than the overall ￿gure.
The key challenge we face in this inquiry is that we only have six years of data. This
severely limits our power to assess the abilities of the individuals in our dataset. We
therefore design our procedures to maximize power. To the extent that the pro￿table
trading opportunities available to skillful individuals are short-lived, the variability of
the unexpected component of a trade￿s return will account for an increasing fraction
of total return variability as the holding period grows. Thus, for short-lived pro￿t
opportunities (such as event-related trading), any inference about abnormal expected
returns is likely to be considerably easier when the focus is on shorter horizons, which
the transactions data allow. With this in mind, we typically focus on the returns
individuals obtain from their trades during the week that follows their trades.
An additional step we take to mitigate the inference problem is that, for most of
the tests, we restrict our attention to accounts that have traded at least 25 times.
While this removes more than 99,000 accounts from consideration, it ensures that for
each account we study we have suﬃc i e n td a t at oe s t i m a t et r a d i n gp r o ￿ts with some
accuracy.
For the factor-based risk adjustment, we estimate time-series regressions of the
7While the discount brokerage data include ￿les with information about account holdings and trades, we
only use the ￿le that records account trades. There are 126,488 accounts in the trades ￿le, but only 115,856
accounts had at least one purchase during the sample period.
6return on each stock net of the Treasury-bill rate on several factors: the excess of
the CRSP value-weighted market over the Treasury-bill rate, a size factor, a book-
to-market factor, and one lag of each of these factors to adjust for the possibility of
non-trading biases. For each month, we estimate these regressions using daily data
for the calendar year ￿nishing at the end of the month. We take the excess return
of each stock during the month in question to be the sum of the intercept in these
regressions plus the error term, or equivalently, the realized return minus the sum
of the factor loadings times the realized value of each of the factors. Both the size
and the book-to-market factors are calculated by taking the equal weighted average
of the top three value-weighted size and book-to-market decile portfolio returns and
subtracting the average of the bottom three decile portfolio returns.
For the characteristic-based risk adjustment, we follow a procedure similar to the
approach used by Daniel et al. (1997) (DGTW). Speci￿cally, we rank each stock
into quintiles based on its market capitalization at the end of the previous month,
its book-to-market ratio based on its most recently announced book equity value
(lagged by at least 60 days to ensure public availability) and its momentum status.
To determine the momentum status of each stock, we sort stocks each month into
deciles based on their return over the previous three months. Any stock that has been
in the highest decile during one of the past three months is considered a winner stock,
while any stock that has been in the lowest decile is considered a loser stock. A stock
that was in the both groups during the last three months is assigned to it most recent
classi￿cation. Stocks that are neither losers nor winners are designated as neither,
resulting in three possible momentum categories. Combining these three momentum
categories with ￿ve size and ￿ve book-to-market categories results in seventy-￿ve
possible classi￿cations for each stock. We calculate daily equal-weighted average
returns for each of these seventy-￿ve stock classi￿cations, taking the characteristic-
adjusted return of a particular stock to be its realized return minus the average return
to a stock with its classi￿cation.
Our tests for stock selection ability focus solely on the performance of trades that
initiate or expand existing positions in companies. We ignore all sales of shares.
Our rationale for this is that we expect that sales are often not strongly driven by
speci￿c analysis of or private information about the sold stock. Liquidity needs, or
the reversing of a position taken long ago in order to diversify may motivate many
sales. Such sales may also be motivated by a desire to move into other ￿rms expected
to outperform the market. Since few accounts place short-sale trades, we ignore them
as well. In contrast, we regard the purchase of a particular stock (as contrasted with
the alternative of investing in a mutual fund) as a relatively clear indication that the
investor expects that stock to outperform the market.
7Using the excess return series, we then calculate the average daily returns earned
during the days that immediately follow a given purchase. Speci￿cally, if an account
purchases shares in a company on a particular date, for our tests that use a weekly
horizon, we calculate the average daily return in that company during the next ￿ve
trading days. Returns calculated using a one-day horizon use only the subsequent
trading day￿s return, whereas those using a one-month horizon use the subsequent
20 trading days￿ returns. We typically do not include the trading day￿s return in our
calculations to ensure that any price pressure created by the purchase￿ particularly
of small companies￿ does not distort our results in favor of the trader.
II. Results
A. Return Correlations
We begin with a simple correlation test for persistence in account performance in
which average account returns are compared across the two sample halves. To be
considered in our calculations, we require accounts to have traded at least 25 times
during the ￿rst half of our sample. The six year sample is split at the end of the
fourth year to ensure that roughly an equivalent number of accounts have traded at
least 25 times in both sample halves. To make sure our results are not contaminated
by, for example, individuals who trade more frequently if their performance is good,
we place no minimum trade restriction on the second half of the sample. We then
calculate the correlation in mean excess returns across the two sample halves.
We calculate correlations of raw and excess returns across the two sample halves.
Risks are adjusted using the Fama and French (1992) 3-Factor Model and using
DGTW characteristic portfolios. To account for the fact that average returns are
calculated with varying precisions across accounts (and across sample halves), we
calculate two additional return correlations. The ￿rst compares the ratio of the mean
return to the return￿s standard deviation (a return/risk ratio) across the two sample
halves. For the second, we compute the (one-sided) p-value associated with the t-
statistic of the hypothesis that a given account￿s excess return is positive during the
sample half. We then calculate the correlation in the account p-values across the two
sample halves. Finally, as a robustness check, we also calculate the correlation in re-
turns obtained in even and odd quarters. The results for the three return correlations
a r er e p o r t e di nt h e￿rst three panels of Table 2.
The correlation in performance across the sample is consistently around 10 per-
cent and highly statistically signi￿cant. The results are signi￿cant for both correlation
8calculations and are largely invariant to whether or how we adjust for risk. The corre-
lations are also consistently positive and signi￿cant for each of our three performance
measures: the simple average returns, the return-risk ratios, and the p-values. The
correlations are also robust to splitting the sample into even and odd quarters instead
of halves. Thus, the results of Table 2 provide the ￿rst evidence of persistence in the
performance of individual traders.
Lastly, to see whether the persistence is due to trader ability (or negative ability)
to time the market, we recompute our tests replacing individual stock returns with
overall value-weighted market returns. This tests whether individuals consistently
purchase stocks before the market rises. When individual stock returns are replaced
with the overall market return, most of the evidence of performance persistence dis-
appears. However, the p-value correlations retain most of its signi￿cance, suggesting
perhaps some persistence in market timing. Overall, though, it appears that the per-
sistence in the performance of individual traders￿ trades come primarily from stock
selection and not market timing.
B. Performance Classi￿cation of Traders
While the above results indicate clear persistence in trader performance, they do not
provide an economic measure of the level of this persistence. An interesting economic
measure, for instance, would be the level of future returns that can be expected of
traders identi￿ed as among the top 10 percent. Similarly, it would be of interest to
know how poorly the bottom 10 percent of traders might be expected to perform in
subsequent trades. To investigate the economic signi￿cance of persistence in trader
performance, we classify traders according to the performance of their trades and
then see how well this classi￿cation explains the returns of subsequent trades.
Since we only have six years of data, and since many traders have not accumulated
as u ﬃcient number of trades to be accurately classi￿ed until fairly late in the sample,
we employ what we call a complementary image procedure to maximize our power
to identify able traders. In this procedure, for each trade placed by a given trader,
we use all other trades he has placed in our dataset to calculate his average return
and the p-value for testing the hypothesis that the mean return of the other trades
is positive. That is, to maximize the accuracy of our classi￿cation of the trader, we
use trades placed in the future as well as those in placed in the past in assessing a
trader￿s ability at a given point in time.
Clearly, this does not represent an implementable trading strategy for someone
observing the individual trades as they were occurring. In order to test whether there
9is a pro￿table trading strategy based upon mimicking individual investor trades, we
later consider a rolling forward procedure. The purpose of the complementary image
procedure is not to design a strategy for making pro￿ts, but to address the scienti￿c
question of whether some traders exhibit superior skill. Although the complementary
image procedure uses ex post data, it does not do so in a way that biases the mea-
surement of traders￿ pro￿ts. In predicting the pro￿t for a given week, the procedure
omits the pro￿to u t c o m ef o rt h a tw e e kf r o mt h es e to fd a t au s e dt oi d e n t i f yt h es e t
of smart traders. Under the null hypothesis that excess returns are independent over
time, this procedure should not generate excess returns.
So, as discussed above, corresponding to each trade of a given trader is an average
return of all other trades placed by this trader, and a p-value that this average return
is positive. We then sort all trades according to the corresponding average returns
and p-values, form deciles, and calculate the average returns of the trades within each
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Table 3 reports the average returns of the trades in each decile during the days
following the trades￿ placement. Portfolios are formed according to the p-values that
the raw returns of each trader￿s other trades during the ￿ve trading days after he
places them are positive. We include only trades of traders that have placed at least
25 trades. In column 1, the average raw return in investors￿ other trades (￿classifying
trades￿), ￿ r, is reported for each decile. The classifying trade average returns range
from negative 24 basis points to positive 108 basis points per day during the week
after they are placed. Since the returns are in raw terms, most deciles have positive
average returns in their other trades.
Column 2 contains the raw return same-day return, r∗
i,t, earned on the trades from
the time the trade is placed the market close. We do not adjust these returns for risk
10since, without time-and-sales data, it is not apparent how to properly benchmark
intraday returns. For most deciles, same-day returns are on average negative. Most
of the accounts appear to concede between 25 and 35 basis points on the day their
trades are placed. This is likely due to the bid-ask spread component of transaction
costs that the traders incur in executing their trades, as discussed in Barber and
Odean (2000). Interestingly, however, the ￿nal two deciles appear to concede far less
in same-day returns costs. The top decile loses only 10 basis points on the day the
trade is executed, and decile nine actually earns an average of 17 basis points by
the end of trading. Relative to the bottom decile, both ￿gures are highly signi￿cant.
Thus, even when we focus on same-day returns, the accounts vary widely in terms of
their ability to initiate positions at low cost.
Columns 3 through 8 report average daily excess returns for each of the portfolios
during the days that follow the placement of their trades. Returns are benchmark-
adjusted using the Fama-French 3-factor model. A wide diﬀerence in returns exists
between the portfolios classi￿ed as having low performance and those classi￿ed with
high performance. While the bottom portfolio loses between 5 and 14 basis points per
day during the 5 subsequent trading days, the top portfolio averages gains of between
3 and 24 basis points. The diﬀerence between the two portfolios begins at 30 basis
points and declines steadily to 8 basis points by the ￿fth day. Even after two weeks, a
signi￿cant diﬀerence between the two portfolios remains, with the high performance
portfolio outperforming the low portfolio by 6 basis points on the tenth trading day.
The ￿nal column of Table 3 reports the average daily holding period return, ri,H,
for trades within each decile. Remarkably, an economically and statistically signi￿cant
spread of 6 basis points remains between the top and bottom deciles of trades. Most
of the spread in holding period returns comes from the top decile. Indeed, the ￿rst
four deciles all have average returns near zero and only the ￿nal two deciles have
returns above three basis points per day. This suggests that although individuals
may underperform the market over short horizons by trading excessively, over the
longer term most performance persistence is concentrated among the individuals with
positive ability.
While the results thus far provide a strong indication of persistent diﬀerences in
the ability of diﬀerent individuals to select stocks, a variety of potential concerns
remain. First, because we have sorted accounts according to the raw returns of their
other trades, we may be sorting on their willingness to assume some sort of risk
not captured by market covariance, size, book/market, or momentum. This concern
suggests that it may be desirable to sort according to a risk-adjusted performance of
11the accounts.8
Second, our risk-adjustment procedure may not be ideal. For instance, those
that view momentum as proxying for some unknown risk-factor may be interested
in seeing whether our results are robust to the removal of the component of returns
that is attributable to a momentum strategy. More generally, it is useful to verify
whether abnormal performance is robust to the employment of a characteristic-based
adjustment that adjusts for momentum.
Third, our sorting of portfolios according to the p-value that their trades have
earned positive pro￿ts may be suspect, particularly because we require that they
have traded at least 25 times. For example, it could be the case that investors who
have done well in the past trade more often because they believe they have ability.9
Similarly, accounts that have done poorly in the past may be more inclined to trade
aggressively to make up for past losses.10 This may result in a post-selection bias
for persistently lucky or unlucky accounts that consequently generate the requisite
25 trades. Thus, despite a likely reduction in our power to identify trader ability
correctly, it is useful to rerun our tests using all accounts that have more than one
trade, sorting only on returns.
Finally, to determine whether our results are driven by trading in stocks in which
investors have private information, we rerun our tests removing all trades in compa-
nies in which the investor￿s account has transacted more than once. It seems unlikely
that many investors obtain private information sporadically in a wide range of com-
panies. This restriction therefore focuses the test on whether there is superior skill at
identifying and exploiting market mispricing. Each of the above tests and robustness
checks are described in Table 4.
The ￿rst column of Table 4 reports the average excess return to each decile. The
portfolios diﬀer markedly in their average excess returns. Trades placed by accounts
whose other trades average returns that are among the bottom 10 percent of all
trades lose 4.9 basis points per day during the next ￿ve trading days. In contrast,
trades placed by accounts ranking in the top decile earn 19.4 basis points per day.
When these returns are benchmark-adjusted the picture remains the same. Using
the factor-based adjustment, the trades of accounts in the bottom decile lose 12 basis
points per day, whereas those of accounts in the top decile earn 15 basis points per
day. Both ￿gures are signi￿cantly diﬀerent from zero and their diﬀerence, 27.5 basis
8Of course, if we have errors in our benchmark, these will induce performance persistence when there is
none. The fact that persistence exists when we sort according to raw returns helps alleviate this concern.
9See Barber and Odean (2000) for supportive evidence.
10Coval and Shumway (2001) document such behavior among market makers in the CBOT US Treasury
Bond pit.
12points, is highly signi￿cant. Because accounts are sorted according to the excess
returns of their other trades, this average daily return diﬀerential is somewhat higher
than the average over the ￿rst ￿ve trading days in Table 3, re￿ecting the improvement
in accuracy in classifying the accounts. The characteristic-based adjustment results
in a slightly lower spread of 22.8 basis points, but one that is still highly statistically
and economically signi￿cant.
The persistence of the poor performance is notable, since it seems to indicate a spe-
cial ability to underperform the market. The losses of these investors are far greater
than the losses of the average individual investor documented by Odean (1999), and
our decile 1 ￿ndings further indicate that this poor performance is present even after
controlling for momentum. The systematic ability of some individuals to underper-
form indicates that access to inside information is not the primary source of abnormal
performance in our sample.
This raises the question of what does cause these individuals to underperform.
By now there are several models of investor psychology and prices in which imper-
fectly rational investors, in the process of producing market mispricing, on average
lose money to more sophisticated ￿arbitrageurs￿ (see, e.g., Hirshleifer (2001) for a re-
view of recent models). Our ￿ndings are consistent with individual investors being a
heterogeneous group that includes bothf o o l i s ha n ds o p h i s t i c a t e dt r a d e r s .
Although the portfolios are constructed using ex-post data, the return diﬀeren-
tials nonetheless raise doubts about the eﬃcient markets hypothesis prediction that
excess returns on an account￿s trades will be independent draws. Either we have ad-
justed for risk incorrectly and thus we have induced some cross-sectional correlation
in the returns through our measurement procedure, or the accounts have signi￿cant
dispersion in their alphas.
One possibility, as mentioned earlier, is that our restriction that accounts must
have traded at least 25 times over the full sample period is introducing a subtle post-
selection bias. To control for this possibility, the ￿fth column sorts all trades of all
accounts according to the average return earned on the account￿s other trades, ad-
justed for risk using the 3-factor model. We would expect his classi￿cation to be far
less precise as a segregator of skillful and lucky investors. Furthermore, it results in
extreme portfolios having a bias towards accounts that trade infrequently. Neverthe-
less, this classi￿cation produces an average return diﬀerential that is consistent with
the previous ￿ndings. Accounts in the bottom decile place trades that lose 8.8 basis
points per day, whereas accounts in the top decile earn 11 basis points per day during
the week following their trades.
13A second possibility is that frequent account trading in the same stock generates
a correlation in trade returns. To control for this possibility, we reclassify accounts
using only trades made in stocks they trade once during our sample. These results
are reported in the ￿nal column of Table 4. Although the statistical signi￿cance
declines somewhat (due to the fact that we have 40 percent fewer observations), the
overall result is unchanged. Although traders in the bottom decile no longer perform
so poorly in subsequent trades, traders in the top decile continue to place trades that
earn nearly 10 basis points per day. The spread between the top and bottom deciles,
12.7 basis point per day, remains highly signi￿cant.
This ￿nding casts further doubt upon the hypothesis that the abnormal perfor-
mance we ￿nd is due to traders trading on inside information. While it is possible
that a subset of the accounts have inside information about a company or two (i.e.
in their employer or friend￿s ￿rm), it seems doubtful that a large number of accounts
have access to inside information in a broad set of companies. Finally, to see whether
the results are concentrated in small, illiquid stocks, or stocks for which individual
investors are likely to be insiders, we rerun our classi￿cation using only the largest
two-thirds of all CRSP ￿rms. Once again, the results (not reported here) remain
essentially the same.
C. An Trading Strategy Based upon Observing Individual Investor Trades
The results thus far indicate that a subset of individual investors have ability of some
s o r t .H o w e v e r ,i ti sn o ty e tc l e a rw h e t h e rt h e s er e s u l t so ﬀer a trading strategy for an
observer to exploit the information contained in the accounts￿ trades. To investigate
the real-time returns oﬀered by individual trade information, we construct zero-cost
portfolios that go long all the trades of accounts that have performed well up to
the current date and go short all the trades of accounts that have performed poorly
up to the current date. As with our earlier tests, to ensure that any price pressure
created by trades does not in￿uence our results, we wait until the day after the trade
is executed to begin measuring returns.
Since we only have six years of data, and much of this is used to assess traders￿
performance, our power to detect abnormal returns is somewhat limited. To maximize
our power to detect abnormal performance, there is a tradeoﬀ. If we only include
trades of accounts with mean returns signi￿cantly diﬀerent from zero, we more reliably
focus on the trades of more skillful versus less skillful traders. However, to the extent
that, at times, only a limited number of accounts can be classi￿ed as unusually
14good (or bad), such a portfolio will be highly undiversi￿ed.11 S i n c ew eo n l yh a v e
one thousand days over which to measure our strategy￿s expected return, such lack
of diversi￿cation can result in the unexpected component of returns becoming so
variable that inference is impossible. On the other hand, if we are lax in our criteria
for including accounts in the strategy, a larger fraction of the trades we mimic are
from accounts lacking in special skill.
To strike a balance, we only consider accounts that have traded at least 25 times
up to the current date, but we sort them into quintile portfolios to ensure that our
portfolio is diversi￿ed. Furthermore, we only measure the returns to our strategy on
days when there are at least 25 stocks in the top and bottom portfolios. Speci￿cally,
we rank all accounts that have traded at least 25 times up to the current date by the
p-value that their excess return is positive. We then compute value-weighted returns
of all the stocks purchased during the last ￿ve days by all accounts in each of the









where MVj is the market value of ￿rm j on date t, rj,t is the return to ￿rm j on
date t,a n dIi,j,t is an indicator variable which is one if an account in portfolio i has
purchased ￿rm j within the holding period preceding date t and zero otherwise.
Using the strategy return de￿ned in equation (3), we calculate the excess return
to the strategy that goes long the top quintile and short the bottom quintile. We use
a 4-factor model to adjust returns for risk, adding a momentum factor to the Fama
French (1992) 3-factor model.12 When we employ the 4-factor model, we calculate
a raw return in equation (3) and then regress the diﬀerence between the top and
bottom portfolio daily return on the four factors. When we benchmark-adjust using
the characteristic-based adjustment, equation (3) is calculated using the individual
￿rm characteristic-adjusted returns. The reported results focus on the 4-factor risk
adjustment though highly similar results are obtained using the characteristic-based
adjustment. To ensure that trading in small, illiquid ￿r m sd o e sn o td r i v et h er e s u l t s ,
we remove the smallest (by capitalization) third of all CRSP ￿rms from the sample.
Finally, we examine the returns to the trading strategy using three portfolio formation
horizons: daily, weekly, and monthly. The results are reported in Table 5.
Beginning with the one-week holding period, the strategy generates excess returns
of 5.1 basis points per day. When only a market factor is used to risk-adjust, the
11Our reliance on value-weighted portfolios makes any lack of diversi￿cation even more pronounced.
12We construct our momentum factor by taking the diﬀerence of the equal-weighted average returns of
the winner portfolio and the loser portfolio identi￿ed by our characteristic adjustment algorithm.
15returns are 4.4 basis points per day. Both ￿gures are signi￿cant at the 5 percent level
but not the 1 percent level. If we measure returns at the daily horizon ￿ that is, on
the trading day following the trade placement ￿ the results are slightly stronger in
economic and statistical terms. The 4-factor excess returns are 6.8 basis points per
day and those adjusted using the market factor are 5.6 basis points per day. When
we move to the one-month horizon, however, the results essentially disappear, falling
below a basis point per day and losing any statistical signi￿cance. The disappearance
of signi￿cance at the monthly horizon suggests that the ability of traders to select
stocks that earn abnormal returns may be con￿ned to fairly short horizons. Alterna-
tively, it may simply illustrate how diﬃcult inference becomes as horizons lengthen
relative to the horizon of the investors￿ pro￿t opportunities, so that a trade￿s alpha
declines relative to the unexpected component of returns.
As described above, estimating the returns to a feasible trading strategy based on
our data involves a careful balance. If we base our strategy on fewer traders with
more extreme past performance, the variability of our results increases. If we base
our strategy on more traders in an eﬀort to reduce the variability of our results, the
average performance of the strategy declines.
In the tests reported in Table 5, we form top and bottom trader-mimicking port-
folios based on the top and bottom quintiles of all ranked traders. We require all
ranked traders to have at least 25 previous trades and we require both the top and
bottom trader mimicking portfolios to consist of at least 25 stocks on any particular
day. For the returns calculated over one week, our requirements mean that out of
1,205 possible trading days, we can only evaluate the returns to our strategy on 1,072
days. If we de￿ne the top and bottom trader mimicking portfolios by taking the top
and bottom deciles of ranked traders, the strategy return can only be estimated on
945 days. Using the top and bottom deciles, the one week intercepts become 4.4
(t =1 .74) basis points for the 4-factor model and 5.1 basis points (t =2 .14) for the
market model. If we de￿ne the top and bottom portfolios as the top and bottom
thirty percent of traders, the number of valid return days becomes 1,101. The inter-
c e p t sb e c o m e3 . 8b a s i sp o i n t s( t =2 .40) for the 4-factor model and 3.1 basis points
(t =2 .05) for the market model. If we estimate the regressions reported in Table 5
with a weighted least squares technique that assigns weights to each observation that
are proportional to the square root of the number of stocks in the top and bottom
portfolios, the intercepts become 4.7 b.p. (t =3 .1) for the 4-factor model and 4.9
b.p. (t =3 .1) for the four-factor model.
16III. Discussion
The above results raise several interesting questions. To begin with, why are the
results so much stronger, both economically and statistically, when portfolios are
formed using all available trade data? Do the additional datapoints really add that
much power? It turns out they do. Their contribution is twofold. First, the additional
data gives us far more information with which to classify traders. With the real time
trading strategy, a trader can be classi￿e du s i n go n l yd a t au pt ot h ep o i n ti nt i m eo f
a given trade. Thus, the accuracy with which a trader is classi￿ed improves steadily
across time. Conversely, when all data are used, each trade can be classi￿ed as if it
is the last. This not only allows us to rank each trader far more accurately. It also
allows us to use more trades of more traders. For instance, using our minimum of
25 trades, a trader who has placed 27 trades will only have two trades considered for
our real time strategy￿s portfolio. On the other hand, when ex-post data are used in
classifying trades, all 27 can count towards portfolio return calculations.
A second question raised by the results is whether they oﬀer the opportunity for
essentially riskless trading pro￿ts to anyone with access to the account trade data.
With only six years of data, the answer is no. While there is a ￿ve basis point spread
in the real time daily returns of the top and bottom quintiles, considering that the
positions are turned over every ￿ve trading days, transaction costs will dominate any
excess returns earned by the strategy. This is likely to be the case even though the
￿ve basis point spread is generated without trading in the smallest third of all CRSP
￿rms.
On the other hand, if one has access to more than six years of data, account per-
formance can be classi￿ed with high precision. So the excess return spread from year
six onward is likely to resemble those calculated in Table 4. Unless round trip trading
costs exceed one percent, it is likely that the excess returns will remain signi￿cantly
positive.
A ￿nal question is whether these returns are generated by trading on inside infor-
mation. While it would be surprising if small accounts at a discount brokerage had
access to inside information, it is possible that a subset of the accounts have access to
important information about their employer or that of a spouse or friend. However,
the fact that the results are not signi￿cantly altered when we remove all trades placed
by a given account multiple times in the same company suggests that this is not the
source of our ￿ndings. Moreover, the abnormal performance of the better accounts is
also essentially unchanged when we remove trades in the smallest third of the ￿rms
in the sample. It seems highly doubtful that a large number of accounts have access
17to inside information in a broad set of medium and large capitalization companies.
IV. Conclusion
Individual investors have been much maligned in the ￿nance literature in recent years.
This paper shows that not all individual investors are foolish. Traders that can be
classi￿ed among the top 10 percent place trades that earn excess returns of between
12 and 15 basis points per day during the following week. These ￿ndings are robust
to how one adjusts for risk, to the removal of small stocks from the sample, and to
the removal of any companies in which the account has traded more than once. On
the other hand, individual investors that consistently place underperforming trades
also exist. Traders classi￿ed among the bottom 10 percent of all traders place trades
that can expect to lose up to 12 basis points per day during the subsequent week.
Our ￿nding that some individual investors have superior investment skills, and
that others systematically underperform, suggests a new perspective on the issue
of whether on average individual traders foolishly trade too much. As discussed
earlier, previous studies have shown that individual investors on average lose money
in their trades. However, if traders vary widely in terms of their ability to select
investments, and if they learn about and develop this ability through trading, it may
in fact be rational for some investors to trade frequently and at a loss, in the hope
of future gains.13 It is still discouraging that, net of costs, individual investors as
a group lose money on average. On the other hand, if traders who learn that they
have unusual ability move their accounts to lower-cost or higher-leveraged trading
venues (e.g. options markets), evidence drawn solely from stock trades may focus
on those investors who are still in the process of learning￿ either how to trade, or
about whether they are good traders. (Any such tendency to change venues would
mitigate the returns obtainable by mimicking the trades of smart traders in our stock-
trading sample, which suggests that true skill diﬀerences may be even greater than
our estimates.)
Finally, this evidence does not support the eﬃc i e n tm a r k e th y p o t h e s i s .T h ea b i l i t y
of individual traders at a discount brokerage to select outperforming companies is not
con￿ned to small ￿rms or only a few ￿rms in which the traders transact frequently; and
some investors persistently trade so as to underperform. These ￿ndings suggest that
investors￿ persistent abnormal performance is not derived primarily from trading on
13As mentioned earlier, those investors who have superior ability at losing money relative to the market
may be individuals who are, in equilibrium, contributing to the creation of market ineﬃciencies. In principle
such an investor has a clear opportunity to learn how to make abnormal pro￿ts by reversing his trading
strategy.
18inside information. The broad ability of some individual investors to achieve abnormal
performance implies a violation of semi-strong form market eﬃciency. An interesting
further question is whether the large brokerage companies are aware of the value of
the information contained in their customers￿ trades.
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22Table 1: Summary Statistics
Table 1 reports summary statistics for the entire set of accounts and for the subset of accounts that have traded at least 25
times during the sample period. Average holding period is the average holding period for an account of all purchases that were
sold later in the dataset. For consecutive buys or sells in a given company, we calculate the time between the last purchase
and the ￿rst sale.
Variable (per account) Mean Median St. Dev. Min. Max.
Full Sample (n =1 1 5 ,856)
Number of Purchases 15.06 6 38.43 1 3,167
Average Dollar Value 8,599 4,369 28,031 0.1 6,011,360
Number of Diﬀerent Firms Purchased 9.20 4 19.68 1 1,523
Number of Purchases Sold Later 9.96 4 25.03 0 2,209
Average Holding Period (days) 378.11 293 321.34 0 2,100
Accounts with at least 25 trades (n =1 6 ,668)
Number of Purchases 66.40 43 83.61 25 3167
Average Dollar Value 10,301 5,675 18,071 50 692,524
Number of Diﬀerent Firms Purchased 36.83 26 41.16 1 1,523
Number of Purchases Sold Later 32.92 22 48.60 0 2,209
Average Holding Period (days) 244.33 199 192.37 0 1,870
23Table 2: Correlation Tests of Performance Persistence
Table 2 reports correlations across the two sample halves between in the average returns earned on ￿rms purchased by a given
account during the ￿ve trading days that follow the purchase. The correlations of sample halves split the sample in half at
the end of the fourth year and calculate the correlation in performance across the two sample halves. Only accounts with
at least 25 trades during the ￿rst four years are included in the calculations. The even/odd quarter correlations divide all
trades into those that occur during the ￿rst and third quarter of the year and those that occur during the second and fourth.
Only accounts with at least 25 trades in odd quarters are considered in the calculations. The p-values are calculated using a
t-distribution and a t-score that average returns are positive. The 3-factor risk-adjusted return correlations regress returns on
daily realizations of the SMB, HML and RMRF factors. The DGTW characteristic-adjusted returns subtract from a given
￿rm￿s daily return the daily return to the equivalent size, book-to-market, and momentum portfolio. The market-timing
returns replace the daily risk-adjusted return of a given ￿rm with the corresponding daily return of the value-weighted market
portfolio. P-values are in parentheses.
Sample Halves Even/Odd Quarters
Variable Pearson Rank Order Pearson Rank Order
Raw Returns
Mean Return 0.055 0.091 0.060 0.079
(0.005) (0.000) (0.004) (0.000)
Mean Ret. / StDev. 0.097 0.109 0.093 0.094
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
p-value 0.114 0.120 0.098 0.107
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
3-Factor Risk-Adjusted Returns
Mean Return 0.069 0.092 0.122 0.108
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Mean Ret. / StDev. 0.090 0.094 0.119 0.102
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
p-value 0.101 0.103 0.099 0.101
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
DGTW Characteristic-Adjusted Returns
Mean Return 0.089 0.099 0.021 0.033
(0.001) (0.000) (0.475) (0.265)
Mean Ret. / StDev. 0.091 0.109 0.049 0.052
(0.001) (0.000) (0.093) (0.079)
p-value 0.112 0.111 0.070 0.071
(0.000) (0.000) (0.018) (0.016)
Market-Timing Returns
Mean Return 0.009 0.012 0.006 0.009
(0.572) (0.437) (0.723) (0.576)
Mean Ret. / StDev. -0.016 0.007 0.057 0.021
(0.345) (0.679) (0.000) (0.208)
p-value 0.029 0.050 0.039 0.073
(0.082) (0.003) (0.022) (0.000)
24Table 3: One-Day Portfolio Returns: Complementary Image Procedure
Table 3 reports the average daily return of trades that have been sorted into deciles according to the assessed ability of the
trader. Portfolios are formed according to the raw returns of each trader￿s other trades during the ￿ve trading days after
he places them. These portfolios only include trades of traders that have placed at least 25 trades. Column 1 reports the
average raw return in traders￿ other trades for each decile, ￿ r. Future one-day returns are calculated for each trading day after
the trade is executed. Column 2 reports the average raw return earned from the time the trade is executed to the same-day
close, r
∗
i,t. Columns 3 through 8 report the risk-adjusted returns of the trade on the trading day one, two, three, four, ￿ve,
and ten trading days after the trade is placed (i.e. ri,t+n where i is the portfolio number and n is the number of trading days
ahead). Column 9 reports the average daily return calculated over the holding period of the given trade, ri,H.R e t u r n sa r e
risk-adjusted using a 3-factor Fama/French model. T-statistics are in parentheses.
Portfolio ￿ ri r∗
i,t ri,t+1 ri,t+2 ri,t+3 ri,t+4 ri,t+5 ri,t+10 ri,H
1( l o w ) -0.0024 -0.0029 -0.0006 -0.0013 -0.0009 -0.0014 -0.0005 -0.0002 -0.0001
2 0.0012 -0.0035 0.0000 -0.0003 -0.0007 -0.0008 -0.0005 -0.0002 0.0000
3 0.0026 -0.0026 0.0003 -0.0002 -0.0004 -0.0004 -0.0003 -0.0001 0.0001
4 0.0030 -0.0033 0.0002 0.0000 0.0000 -0.0006 -0.0002 0.0001 0.0001
5 0.0045 -0.0031 0.0008 0.0005 0.0003 -0.0003 -0.0002 0.0002 0.0003
6 0.0046 -0.0023 0.0006 0.0000 0.0002 -0.0002 0.0003 0.0003 0.0002
7 0.0057 -0.0027 0.0012 0.0005 0.0002 -0.0003 0.0001 0.0003 0.0002
8 0.0075 -0.0026 0.0013 0.0010 0.0005 0.0001 0.0003 0.0002 0.0003
9 0.0073 -0.0017 0.0012 0.0007 0.0004 0.0002 0.0001 0.0001 0.0004
10 (high) 0.0108 -0.0010 0.0024 0.0012 0.0010 0.0006 0.0003 0.0004 0.0005
10-1 0.0019 0.0030 0.0025 0.0019 0.0020 0.0008 0.0006 0.0006
(13.7) (20.3) (18.3) (14.1) (15.3) (6.2) (5.0) (8.2)
25Table 4: Five-Day Portfolio Returns: Complementary Image Procedure
Table 4 reports the average daily return of trades that have been sorted into deciles according to the assessed ability of the
trader. Returns are calculated by averaging the returns of the ￿rm over the ￿ve days after it was purchased. The ￿rst ￿ve
columns of numbers are for portfolios that have been formed according to the p-value that the trader￿s other trades have
a positive average return. These portfolios only include trades of traders that have placed at least 25 trades. The ￿rst
column reports the average daily return in excess of the risk-free rate for each portfolio. The next column reports the standard
deviation of this excess return. The next two columns report 3-factor risk-adjusted and DGTW characteristic-adjusted returns.
The ￿nal two columns report 3-factor risk-adjusted returns for portfolios formed using two alternative sorting procedures. In
the second-last column, stocks are sorted according to the raw returns earned by that trader in his other trades, regardless
of how few trades the trader has placed. In the ￿nal column, only stocks that have been traded once by a given account are
included in the calculation of probabilities and returns. T-statistics are in parentheses.
Sorted on returns Stocks traded
Excess Returns No min. trade number only once
Portfolio Mean Std. Dev. 3-Factor Alpha DGTW Alpha 3-Factor Alpha 3-Factor Alpha
1 (low) -0.00049 0.01556 -0.00123 -0.00109 -0.00088 -0.00030
2 0.00020 0.01588 -0.00034 0.00002 -0.00049 -0.00040
3 0.00036 0.01593 -0.00019 -0.00043 -0.00023 -0.00031
4 0.00063 0.01516 -0.00011 0.00028 -0.00014 0.00011
5 0.00088 0.01529 0.00041 -0.00025 0.00031 0.00028
6 0.00082 0.01528 0.00011 0.00029 0.00006 0.00046
7 0.00109 0.01539 0.00030 0.00027 0.00053 -0.00025
8 0.00116 0.01523 0.00100 0.00067 0.00058 0.00054
9 0.00162 0.01482 0.00053 0.00039 0.00045 0.00004
10 (high) 0.00194 0.01511 0.00152 0.00119 0.00110 0.00096
10-1 0.00275 0.00228 0.00198 0.00127
(21.7) (18.0) (17.5) (7.0)
26Table 5: Trading Strategy Returns
Table 5 reports the results of a regression of a trading strategy￿s return on the daily realizations (and lagged realizations) of
four factors: the market return minus the risk-free rate (RMRF), the return of high minus low book-to-market stocks (HML),
the return of small minus large stocks (SMB), and the return of a momentum portfolio that is long past winners and short
past losers (MOM). Portfolios are constructed by sorting on each date accounts that have traded at least 25 times up to that
d a t eb a s e do nt h ep-values of their past trades. Only the largest two-thirds of all CRSP stocks are included in portfolios. For
the three holding periods, returns are measured using the ￿rst trading day (One Day), ￿rst ￿ve trading days (One Week), and
￿rst twenty trading days (One Month) after the trade is placed. The returns are then value-weighted within each portfolio.
The strategy￿s returns are constructed by going long the top quintile and short the bottom quintile on days when at least 25
stocks are in each quintile. T-statistics are in parentheses.
Factor-Adjusted Returns: High Minus Low Portfolio (Daily Returns)
Holding Period
V a r i a b l e O n eD a y O n eW e e k O n eM o n t h
Intercept 0.00056 0.00068 0.00044 0.00051 0.00001 0.00003
(2.5) (2.9) (2.3) (2.5) (0.1) (0.44)
RMRFt -0.08337 -0.14988 -0.06742 -0.05512 -0.01661 -0.01423
(-2.1) (-2.9) (-1.9) (-1.2) (-1.29) (-0.85)
HMLt -0.20600 -0.03326 -0.00531
(-3.6) (-0.7) (-0.31)
SMBt -0.02491 0.01311 0.03023
(-0.4) (0.2) (1.4)
MOMt -0.00311 -0.03714 0.03605
(-0.1) (-1.1) (2.82)
RMRFt−1 0.12728 0.05398 0.00152
(2.3) (1.2) (0.09)
HMLt−1 -0.06553 0.000318 -0.01444
(-1.0) (0.0) (-0.67)
SMBt−1 -0.00197 -0.0291 -0.00264
(0.0) (-0.6) (-0.16)
MOMt−1 0.06540 0.09720 -0.01418
(1.6) (2.8) (-1.12)
n 911 911 1072 1072 1191 1191
27